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1. Introduction 
The text book view suggests that the competing firms gain from a lower product-
market competition at the expense of the consumers, which creates a concern for the 
antitrust authorities. We show that this view may not be correct in the presence of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), which dominates international trade in recent years 
(UNCTAD, 2006). 
 Considering an international oligopoly with endogenous decision on FDI and 
export, and measuring lower product-market competition by higher product 
differentiation as in Raith (2003), Aghion et al. (2005) and Sacco and Schmutzler 
(2011), to name a few, we show that a lower product-market competition increases 
the foreign firm’s incentive for FDI. On one hand, a higher product differentiation 
tends to reduce consumer surplus and welfare by increasing local monopoly power of 
the firms. On the other hand, a higher product differentiation induces FDI and tends to 
increase consumer surplus and welfare by saving the trade cost under export. If the 
latter effect is stronger than the former, which happens if product differentiation does 
not decrease too much, a lower product-market competition increases consumer 
surplus and welfare. 
 The Schumpeterian view suggests that lower product-market competition may 
benefit the consumers by creating positive effects on innovation (Schumpeter, 1943), 
while Arrow (1962) suggests the opposite. There is another literature comparing the 
effects of different types of product-market competition, viz., Cournot and Bertrand, 
on welfare. It shows that whether welfare is higher under relatively more fierce 
competition, i.e., under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, may 
depend on the effects of competition on innovation (see, e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984, 
Delbono and Denicolò, 1990 and Qiu, 1997). Contrary to these papers, we show the 
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effects of competition on FDI and welfare. While the above-mentioned papers mainly 
consider different number of firms and different product-market choice variables 
(viz., quantity and price) to capture the effects of competition, different degrees of 
product differentiation capture the effects of competition in this paper. Hence, in our 
paper, the number of firms and the product-market choice variables are the same 
under different product-market competition. 
Symeonidis (2008) shows that a lower product-market competition may 
benefit the consumers in the presence of input market imperfection. Deltas et al. 
(2012) show that a lower product-market competition may benefit the consumers due 
to the “home market principle”, which gives the cartel members preference for 
supplying their home markets. Mukherjee and Sinha (2014) show that a lower 
product-market competition may benefit the consumers in the presence of strategic 
trade policies. However, the effect of a lower product-market competition on FDI is 
responsible for increasing consumer surplus and welfare in our paper. 
 
2. FDI vs. export and product-market cooperation 
Assume that there is a foreign firm (firm 1), which competes with a domestic firm 
(firm 2) with a differentiated product in the domestic market.  We assume that firm 1 
can serve the domestic market either through export or through FDI. While export 
requires a per-unit trade cost, t, FDI requires a fixed investment, F. We normalize the 
marginal costs of production for both firms to zero. 
We consider demand functions similar to Shubik and Levitan (1980), which 
allows us to focus only on the effects of competition by ignoring the love for variety 
effect of product differentiation. Assume that the inverse market demand function 
faced by the ith firm is 1 (2 )i i jP q q     , where , 1,2i j  , i j  and [0,1]   
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show the degree of product differentiation. As   decreases, it increases product 
differentiation and creates a lower intensity of competition. If 0  , the products are 
isolated and if 1  , the products are perfect substitutes. 
 We consider the following game. At stage 1, firm 1 decides whether to export 
or to undertake FDI. At stage 2, the firms choose their outputs simultaneously and the 
profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 
2.1. Export by firm 1 
If firm 1 exports at stage 1, firms 1 and 2 maximise  
1
1 1(P )
q
Max t q  and 
2
2 2
q
Max P q  
respectively to determine their outputs. The equilibrium outputs are 
*
1
4 2 (2 ) 3
(4 )(4 3 )
x tq
 
 
  

 
 and *2
4 (3 )
(4 )(4 3 )
x tq

 
 

 
. We assume that 
3(1 )
( )
2(2 )
t t




 

, which ensures that the outputs of both firms are always positive.  
 The profits of firms 1 and 2 are 
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1 2 2
(2 )[4 2 (2 ) 3 )]
(4 ) (4 3 )
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(2 )[4 (3 t) ]
(4 ) (4 3 )
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  

 
. (1) 
Consumer surplus, welfare of the domestic country and world welfare are respectively 
2 2
*
2 2
1 3 (1 ) 3(2 )
6 (4 3 ) (4 )
x t tCS

 
  
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  
,       (2) 
* * *
2
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 We get that 
* 2 2
3 3
( ) (2 3 ) (2 )
0
2(4 3 ) (4 )
xCS t t
  
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, 
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2 2
( ) 1 3 (2 ) (4 )(2 )
0
8 (4 3 ) (4 )
xDW t t t t
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* 2 2
3 3
( ) (5 3 ) (2 )(2 )
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xWW t t 
  
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  for [0, ]t t . 
 The following lemma is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Lemma 1: If firm 1 exports, higher production differentiation (i.e., a lower  ), 
implying lower product-market competition reduces consumer surplus, domestic 
welfare and world welfare. 
 
 Higher product differentiation gives both firms more monopoly power, thus 
reducing consumer surplus, domestic welfare and world welfare. 
 
2.2. FDI by firm 1 
Under FDI, firms 1 and 2 maximise 
1
1 1P
q
Max q F  and 
2
2 2
q
Max P q  respectively to 
determine their outputs. The equilibrium outputs are F* *1 2
1
4
Fq q

 

. 
The profits of firms 1 and 2 are 
 *1 2
2
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F F
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
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
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2
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
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
.               (3) 
Consumer surplus, welfare of the domestic country and world welfare are respectively 
*
2
2
(4 )
FCS



,                    (4) 
* * *
2
F F FDW CS   and * * * *1 2
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 We get that 
*
3
( ) 4
0
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. 
 The following lemma is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Lemma 2: If firm 1 undertakes FDI, higher production differentiation reduces 
consumer surplus, domestic welfare and world welfare. 
 
 The reason for Lemma 2 is similar to that Lemma 1. 
 
2.3. The incentive for FDI 
Firm 1 undertakes FDI if * *1 1
x F   or 
 
2
2 2
4 (2 ) [4 (2 ) 3 ]
( )
(4 ) (4 3 )
t t
F F
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
 
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 
,               (5) 
i.e., if the cost of FDI is less than ( )F  , which is firm 1’s maximum willingness to 
invest for FDI for a given product differentiation. 
 
Proposition 3: Higher product differentiation increases Firm 1’s incentive for FDI. 
Proof: We get that 
3 3
( ) 4 (2 )[(4 3 )(8 3(2 ) ) t(2 )(16 (8 3 ))]
0
(4 ) (4 3 )
F t       
  
        
 
  
 for [0, ]t t , 
which proves the result. ■ 
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 Higher product differentiation increases firm 1’s profits under both export and 
FDI. However, the increase in profit is higher under FDI than under export due to the 
distortion created by the trade cost under export. 
 
2.4. The effects of higher product differentiation 
Figure 1 plots consumer surplus under FDI and export by firm 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The effects of product differentiation on consumer surplus 
 
In Figure 1, the lines AA and BB show consumer surplus under FDI and export by 
firm 1 respectively. We draw these lines as straight lines, for simplicity of exposition. 
It is easy to check from (2) and (4) that, for a given  , consumer surplus is higher 
under FDI than under export by firm 1. It is immediate from Figure 1 that if product 
differentiation increases, thus creating lower product-market competition, it decreases 
consumer surplus if firm 1 either exports or undertakes FDI irrespective of the level of 
product differentiation. This happens since higher product differentiation increases 
local monopoly power of the firms. 
An interesting situation arises if lower product differentiation induces firm 1 
to switch from export to FDI. To see this, assume that the degree of product 
differentiation is G and firm 1 exports. Consumer surplus in this situation is given by 
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point E. Now consider that product differentiation increases in a way so that the new 
product differentiation parameter falls between G and H and firm 1 switches the mode 
from export to FDI. In this situation, consumer surplus is given by the points between 
M and F on line AA. It is clear from Figure 1 that higher product differentiation 
increases consumer surplus in this situation. 
If product differentiation increases in a way so that the new product 
differentiation parameter is less than H and firm 1 switches from export to FDI, 
higher product differentiation decreases consumer surplus. 
 If product differentiation induces firm 1 to undertake FDI, on one hand, higher 
product differentiation increases the firms’ local monopoly power and tends to 
decrease consumer surplus. On the other hand, if higher production differentiation 
induces firm 1 to undertake FDI, it saves the trade cost and tends to increase 
consumer surplus. If product differentiation does not fall too much but it induces FDI, 
it creates a stronger latter effect than the former and higher product differentiation 
increases consumer surplus. However, higher product differentiation decreases 
consumer surplus if the former effect is stronger than the latter. 
 Since domestic welfare decreases with higher product differentiation and its 
value under FDI by firm 1 is higher than that of under export by firm 1, we can say 
that a lower product-market competition due to a higher product differentiation 
increases domestic welfare if it induces FDI by firm 1 and the benefit from trade cost 
saving is higher than the loss from the firm’s increased local monopoly power. 
 Finally, consider the effect of a higher product differentiation on world 
welfare, which is the summation of domestic welfare and net profit of the foreign 
firm. We find from (1) that 
*
1 0
x




 for [0, ]t t , implying that higher product 
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differentiation, say, from 
0  to 1 , where 1 0  , increases firm 1’s profit under 
export. If higher product differentiation, 
1 , induces firm 1 to undertake FDI, its profit 
under “FDI with 
1 ,” is higher than its profit under “export with 1 ,”, which is higher 
than its profit under “export with 
0 ”. It is then immediate that if higher product 
differentiation increases domestic welfare by inducing FDI by firm 1, it also increases 
world welfare. 
 The following proposition summarises the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 2: If lower product-market competition due to higher product 
differentiation induces FDI by the foreign firm, it increases consumer surplus, 
domestic welfare and world welfare if the benefit from trade cost saving is higher 
than the loss from higher monopoly power.    
 
3. Conclusion 
In contrast to the usual belief that a lower product-market competition decreases 
consumer surplus and welfare, we show that a lower product-market competition may 
increase consumer surplus and welfare by attracting FDI which helps to improve cost 
efficiency in the industry. Thus, our paper provides an important insight for antitrust 
authorities in framing competition policies. It is important to note that the welfare 
gain in our paper is not due to the standard “tariff jumping” benefit from FDI, where 
the degree of competition remains the same under pre and post era of FDI. 
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 To prove our point, we consider a demand structure where the degree of 
product differentiation does not affect the total demand,
1
 thus ignoring the effects of 
love for variety. However, if one considers a demand structure where higher product 
differentiation increases total demand, thus incorporating the effects of love for 
variety,
2
 it is immediate that a lower product-market competition due to a higher 
product differentiation increases the possibility of a higher consumer surplus and 
welfare by increasing the total demand. 
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